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Introduction to Part 1.   
 
This is Part 1 of a four part paper, intended to redress some of the most fundamental 
confusions in the subject of physical time directionality, and present the concepts 
accurately. There are widespread fallacies in the subject that need to be corrected in 
introductory courses for physics students and philosophers. Parts 1 and 2 are about 
quantum mechanics, Part 3 is about fundamental concepts, and Part 4 is about 
cosmology.  
 
We start here by immediately analyzing the time reversal symmetry of quantum 
probability laws. Time reversal symmetry is defined as the property of invariance 
under the time reversal transformation, T: t  -t. This property is also variously 
called time symmetry, time reversibility, or just reversibility. Two main analyses are 
given, first in Part 1 here and second in Part 2, showing that:  
 Quantum mechanics (classical or relativistic) is strongly time asymmetric in its 
probability laws.  
 Quantum mechanics (classical) is time asymmetric in its deterministic laws.  
 
This contradicts the orthodox analysis, found throughout the conventional literature 
on physical time, which claims that quantum mechanics is time symmetric or 
reversible. This is widely claimed as settled scientific fact, and large philosophical 
and scientific conclusions are drawn from it. But it is an error. The fact is that: 
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 While quantum mechanics is widely claimed to be reversible on the basis of two 
formal mathematical properties (that it does have), these properties do not 
represent invariance under the time reversal transformation. They are 
independent of time symmetry. 
 
Most physicists remain unaware of the errors, decades after they were first 
demonstrated. Many orthodox specialists in the philosophy of physics are aware of the 
errors, but continue to refer to the ‘time symmetry’ or ‘reversibility’ of quantum 
mechanics anyway – and exploit the ambiguity to claim false implications about 
physical time reversal symmetry in nature. The excuse for perpetrating the confusion 
is that, since it is has now become customary to refer to the formal properties of 
quantum mechanics as ‘reversibility’ or ‘time reversal symmetry’, we should just 
keep referring to them by this name, even though they are not time reversal symmetry.  
This causes endless confusion, especially in attempts to explain the physical 
irreversibility of our universe, and in philosophical discussions of the implications for 
the nature of time. The failure of genuine time reversal symmetry in quantum 
mechanics changes the interpretation of modern physics in a deep way. It changes the 
problem of explaining the real irreversibility found throughout nature.  
Continuing to obfuscate this issue with semantic games is not acceptable for 
science. We may as well call a convicted man ‘guilty’, long after he has been proved 
innocent of his crime, on the grounds that it has become a popular convention, and it 
would embarrass the authorities to change their language to call him ‘innocent’. We 
can save the academic authorities the embarrassment of admitting their mistake about 
time symmetry by saying: “quantum mechanics is time symmetric (in the sense of 
having certain formal properties), but not time symmetric (in the sense that it is not 
symmetric under time reversal)”. But only by denying the truth. Scientists cry foul if 
this semantic obfuscation is seen in other subjects: and it is unacceptable in physics.  
Partly as a result of such obfuscation, the broader conceptual analysis of ‘time 
symmetry’, ‘time directionality’ and related concepts is fatally confused. It needs 
fundamental revision too. But rather than starting with the conceptual analysis (which 
physicists find boring), we start directly with a real analysis of quantum mechanics, to 
see immediately why there is such a problem.  
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Part 1. Irreversibility of probabilistic laws of quantum 
mechanics. 
 
1.1 The orthodox analysis.  
Quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory, and there is a long-standing controversy 
about the time symmetry of its probabilistic laws. The orthodox analysis claims that 
the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics are reversible. The usual argument is 
quite simple. It start with this premise: 
 
(1*)  The condition for time reversal symmetry of a probabilistic theory of physics is: 
     prob(s1s2) = prob(Ts2Ts1)
1 
        (future directed probability) (future directed probability) 
 
This states a criterion for reversibility or time symmetry: i.e. that the probability of a 
state transition from an earlier to a later state must be equal, in all cases, to the 
probability of the reversed transition, from the reversed later state to the reversed 
earlier state. Quantum mechanics predicts such probabilities, and a simple argument 
shows that it satisfies the condition (1*). It can be summarized in a couple of lines:  
 
(2)  The quantum mechanics probability for: prob(s1s2) equals the square of the 
inner product: |<s2|s1>|
2. Likewise: prob(Ts2Ts1) = |<Ts1|Ts2>|
2. It is a simple 
mathematical fact that: |<s2|s1>|
2 = |<s1|s2>|
2 = |<Ts1|Ts2>|
2. Hence the condition 
required by (1*) is satisfied.2 
 
Argument done and dusted. What could possibly be wrong with that? Well, there is a 
hole in it you could drive a truck through. It is not the inference in Step (2). It is the 
assumption in Step (1*). This is false. The correct condition is in fact: 
                                                 
1 The term: prob(s1s2) refers to the transition probability from an initial state s1 to a 
final state s2 when measured a short time later. Ts1 and Ts2 are the time reversals of 
states s1 and s2.  
2 Note this is independent of whether we choose T or T* as the time reversal operator 
– the question raised in Part 2 – for: |<Ts1|Ts2>|
2 = |<T*s1|T*s2>|
2. So we can ignore 
this subsequent question until Part 2. 
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The correct criterion for reversibility of a probabilistic theory. 
(1)  The condition for time reversal symmetry of a probabilistic theory is:  
   prob(s2(t +t)|s1(t)) = prob(Ts2(t -t)|Ts1(t))3 
       (future-directed probability) (past-directed probability)4 
 
How do we know this is the correct criterion, rather than (1*)? Because it has been 
proven by careful analysis.5 We will review this shortly. But first we emphasize that 
quantum mechanics fails the condition (1). This requires past-directed probabilities in 
symmetry with the normal future-directed probabilities of quantum mechanics. But 
quantum mechanics supports no past-directed probabilities like this at all – except in 
the special condition of thermodynamic equilibrium. This law would imply that a state 
Ts1 is preceded by the state Ts2 with a law-like probability. But there are no general 
quantum mechanical laws relating present states to earlier states. There are general 
laws relating present states to subsequent states.  
Indeed it is quite certain that quantum mechanics fails (1), from the fact that the 
universe is in thermodynamic disequilibrium. For the symmetry (1) combined with 
symmetry (1*) entails a state of equilibrium. We will see this next, but first we 
examine (1). Where did the past-directed probabilities in (1) come from? The right-
hand term in the criterion for reversibility must be the time reversed image of the left 
hand term: prob(s2(t +t)|s1(t)). This left hand term is a future-directed probability 
law. Watanabe (1955, 1965, 1966) seems to be the first to fully understand that the 
time reversal of a future-directed law: prob(s2(t +t)|s1(t)) must be a past-directed 
law: prob(Ts2(t -t)|Ts1(t)). He proved this. But his proofs of this were ignored, and 
almost every writer on the time reversal of quantum physics over the last 60 years 
have implicitly or explicitly assumed (1*) without question. 
                                                 
3 We cannot use the abbreviated arrow notation of (1*) to write this – we have to 
expand it into its more explicit conditional probability form. 
4 We refer to future-directed or predictive laws, and past-directed or retrodictive laws. 
These pairs are almost synonymous, and used interchangeably here. However future-
directed and past-directed has the connotation of objective probabilities. Predictive 
and retrodictive has the connotation of epistemic probabilities, and predicting and 
retrodicting, a human activity. The difference is slight, but important to philosophers.  
5 Originally by Watanabe 1955; a more comprehensive treatment with rigorous proofs 
is given in Holster 2003. Healy 1993 also understood the principle.  
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Proof of the criterion.  
The criterion we adopt to judge the reversibility of a theory has to be proven to 
correctly represent time reversal invariance. A rigorous proof of (1) and disproof of 
(1*), verifying Watanabe’s less formal proofs, is given in Holster (2003); I will 
explain only the key points of it here. But to begin with, simply the realization that a 
proof of the criterion has to be given is the major step forward. A generation of 
authorities would claim (1*) without analysis, like Sklarr (1974): 
 
“If the laws of nature are time reversal invariant, then for any process that 
occurs in the world, the process that consists in starting with the time-reversed 
final state of the original evolution and ending up with the time-reversed 
initial state of the original process is equally compossible with the laws of 
nature. . .. Remember, of course, that in the quantum-theoretic context it is the 
transition probabilities between reversed states which must equal the 
probabilities of the unreversed states taken in opposite temporal order for the 
laws to be time reversal invariant. The physics of time reversal invariance, 
then, is quite simple.” Sklarr (1974) p 368. 
 
Similarly Davies (1974) just knows it is a fact: 
“the probabilistic principle of micro-reversibility” requires: “ω = ωrev, where 
ω is the transition probability |(ψ, φ)|2, and ωrev = |(T φ, Tψ|2 ”.  
 
These are just two different statements of (1*). However simple examples show (1*) 
must be wrong in principle. First it is not a necessary condition for time symmetry. 
 
Counter-example 1: a simple reversible theory that fails (1*) and satisfies (1). 
We define a very simple time symmetric probabilistic theory. This governs a process 
that has just three possible states, A, B, C, which are their own time reversals:  
TA =A,  TB = B,  TC = C 
The state jumps at a fixed interval (every second) from one state to another. From 
state A it jumps to B or C with equal probabilities of ½. From state B or C, it always 
jumps back to state A. I.e.  
prob(B(t+1)|A(t))= ½  


















p=0.5           p=1         p=0.5           p=1          
 
Figure 1. Future transition probabilities for a simple reversible theory. 
 
Now the theory is clearly time symmetric or reversible: for the probability of any 
sequence of states is exactly the same as the probability for the reversed sequence.  
E.g. an actual sub-sequence might go:  
…ACABABACABACACA… 
Its reversal would be:  
…ACACABACABABACA… 
These are two different sequences of course, but they have identical probabilities.  
To prove this:  
 Any sequence with N occurrences of either B or C has a probability: p = (½)N.  
 The time reversal of any sequence with N occurrences of either B or C is another 
sequence with N occurrences of either B or C, and hence also has: p = (½)N. 
Therefore:  
 The theory entails that the probability of any process is exactly same as the 
probability of the time reversed process. 
  
Indeed the theory is obviously time symmetric. However it fails the orthodox 
criterion, (1*). E.g.  
    predictive:  prob(B(t+1)|A(t))= ½   
≠ predictive:   prob(TA(t+1)|TB(t))= 1 
And similarly for all other transitions. According to the orthodox criterion, these 
should be equal for a reversible theory, but they ain’t. However the theory does satisfy 
the correct criterion, (1), e.g.  
    predictive: prob(B(t+1)|A(t))= ½  
 = retrodictive: prob(TB(t-1)|TA(t))= ½  
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And similarly for all the other possible transitions. It is obvious enough that the 
retrodictive probability that state A came from the state B, is the same as the 
predictive probability that state A will go to the state B. But we should give a proof 











Figure 2. All the paths to reach A. 
 
If the state A occurs at a time t+2, it is always preceded by A at t, i.e. two state 
transitions previously, because the only immediate states preceding A are B or C, and 
both must be preceded by A. I.e. every A originates either from: A  B  A, or from: 
A  C  A. Both have the probability of ½.  
 
This simple model system shows in principle that:  
 (1*) is not a necessary condition for time reversal symmetry  
since (1*) fails for this reversible theory. By contrast, (1) is consistent with it.  
A full proof of course requires a proof that (1) is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for time symmetry; and a proof that (1*) is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for time symmetry. Here we will give a simple derivation of (1), and then 
another counter-example showing (1*) is not sufficient.  
The essential problem is to determine the time reversed image of a predictive 
probability law:  
 L (predictive law):   prob(s2(t +t)|s1(t)) = p 
The normal procedure is to apply the transformation T: t  -t to all the terms in the 
expression, including taking time reversal of all the states. Doing this immediately 
gives: prob(Ts2(-t-t)|Ts1(-t))=p. And since the term t is universally quantified, this is 
equivalent to: 
 TL (retrodictive law):  prob(Ts2(t-t)|Ts1(t)) = p 
Notice that in the time reversal the time order of the reversed states is the opposite of 
the time order of the initial states. However this is achieved by reversing the times. 
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The order of the states in the conditional probability expression itself is not reversed 
(as it is in the orthodox analysis – an error in apply the time reversal transformation).  
Now if a theory entails the first law, L, to be time symmetric it must also entail the 
time reversal of that law. And vice versa. Thus the condition for reversibility is:  
prob(s2(t +t)|s1(t)) = prob(Ts2(t-t)|Ts1(t)) 
This is the criterion (1).  
If there is still a doubt about this, we can decompose the conditional probabilities 
in more detail as absolute probabilities, using Bayes theorem:  
 
prob(s2(t +t)|s1(t)) =df  prob(s2(t +t) & s1(t)) 
 prob(s1(t)) 
 
and repeat the exercise of substituting terms with their time reversals; with same 
result. Or we can look at it in terms of statistical ensembles, again with the same 
result. It can be quickly verified that the time reversal of any ensemble conforming to 
the predictive law must conform to the retrodictive law. Let us do this with an 
example to illustrate.  
 
Counter-example 2. An irreversible theory that satisfies (1*) and fails (1). 
Consider the following fragment of a theory which is defined to satisfy (1*), i.e. in this 
theory: p(s2(t)|s1(t-t))= p(Ts1(t)|Ts2(t-t)) for all states. All transition probabilities 
involving a state B or TB are shown. All transition probabilities are just ½, and the 
theory looks nicely symmetric. (Since (1*) is satisfied, this could match the quantum 
transitions for some simple quantum system.) 
 
Transition Probabilities: Inverse Transition Probabilities (1*): 
p(D(t+t)|B(t)) = ½ p(TD(t+t)|TB(t)) = ½ 
p(E(t+t)|B(t)) = ½  p(TE(t+t)|TB(t)) = ½  
p(B(t+t)|A(t)) = ½ p(TA(t+t)|TB(t)) = ½  
p(B(t+t)|Z(t)) = ½ p(TZ(t+t)|TB(t)) = ½  
(The probabilities in blue are tested in the hypothetical sample below.) These are all 
states relevant to B. There are of course further transitions between other states, e.g.  
p(C(t+t)|A(t)) = ½ p(TA(t+t)|TC(t)) = ½  
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Figure 3. All the possible transitions from B or TB, and to B or TB  
are illustrated (and one extra: AC). All arrows represent probabilities of ½.  
 
To test these laws, we now take a system that we can observe in our environment, 
observe it over a period of time, and select all occurrences of processes that go into 
either state B or TB. We record the previous and subsequent states. We then analyze 
the frequencies of state transitions to verify the probability laws above.  
Let us suppose that we empirically observe the following sample: does this 
confirm or disconfirm the probability laws? 
 
A  B  D 
TD TB  TA 
A  B  D A  B  E A  B  E 
TD TB  TZ 
 
 
Figure 4. A sample S of transitions consistent with the probability laws.  
Different transition sequences are in different colours. 
 
We can count the frequencies in our sample of states B and TB and their transitions.  
freq(B) = 4 
freq(BD) = 2 freq(BD)/ freq(B) = ½  
freq(BE) = 2  freq(BE)/ freq(B) = ½  
freq(TB) = 2 
freq(TBTA) = 1  freq(TBTA)/ freq(TB) = ½ 
freq(TBTZ) = 1  freq(TBTZ)/ freq(TB) = ½ 
 
This sample is obviously consistent with the probability laws. So we may imagine it is 
typical of samples in a universe satisfying those laws. Of course this sample is small 
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(for illustration), but imagine we take a much larger sample, let say with 1,000 times 
the numbers here, and the frequencies conform quite closely to those here (within 
expected statistical fluctuations). Then we would say we have good confirmation of 
the probability laws. Suppose our sample instead produced frequencies like: freq(B) = 
4,000, freq(BD) = 3,000, freq(BE) = 1,000. This would surely disconfirm the 
claim that:  p(D(t+t)|B(t)) = ½. (It would appear to confirm: p(D(t+t)|B(t)) ≈ ¾ 
instead).  
To confirm the probabilities are general laws of nature, we would also need to 
confirm it many times, with different systems. If we found the probabilities broke 
down sometimes, we would reject the probabilities as general laws.  
Now it is important of course that we select our sample by choosing all cases of B 
and TB. E.g. if we ‘post-selected’ it by only allowing cases with transitions like: 
BD, for example, then of course it is not valid to test the laws: p(D(t)|B(t-t)) = ½ 
and  p(D(t)|B(t-t)) = ½, because we have excluded most cases of: A C through our 
selection criterion.  
But we have not post-selected or pre-selected the sample by deliberately choosing 
either special states that the B states transition into, or special states the B states have 
transitioned from. We have included all cases of B or TB that occur, independently of 
the pre-states or post-states. We have allowed nature to select the transitions to and 
from B and TB. The selection criterion is unbiased and time symmetric w.r.t. B and 
TB.  If appropriate frequencies failed to occur for states following B, we would 
dismiss the probabilities as laws. Indeed, how can we even conceive testing 
probabilistic laws (like those of quantum mechanics or thermodynamics), except by 
such experiments?  
We now consider the time reversal of the sample. This is as follows: 
 
A  B  D 
TD TB  TA TE  TB TA TE TB TA 
Z  B  D 
TD TB  TA 
 
 
Figure 5. Sample TS is the time reversal of sample S.  




freq(B) = 2 
freq(BD) = 2 freq(BD)/ freq(B) = 1  
freq(BE) = 0  freq(BE)/ freq(B) = 0  
freq(TB) = 4 
freq(TBTA) = 4  freq(TBTA)/ freq(TB) = 1 
freq(TBTZ) = 0  freq(TBTZ)/ freq(TB) = 0 
 
Yikes! This time reversed sample does not reflect the original probability laws at all! 
E.g. it would indicate that: p(TA(t+t)|TB(t)) = 1. The laws are not time symmetric. If 
they were time symmetric then the time reversal of any process satisfying those laws 
must also satisfy those laws.  
Since those laws do satisfy the condition (1*), we see that: 
 
 The condition (1*) does not ensure time reversibility. It is not a sufficient 
condition. 
 
By such means, it can be confirmed that the orthodox criterion (1*) is wrong. The 
probability: prob(Ts1(t +t)|Ts2(t)) is logically independent of the time reversal of 
prob(s2(t +t)|s1(t)). (1*) is not an ‘alternative choice of criterion for time reversal’ or 
an ‘alternative concept of time reversal’. (1*) is simply a false criterion: it has nothing 
to do with time reversal symmetry. In fact it is not even a symmetry in the proper 
sense: for it is not based on any fundamental transformation.  
We now show why quantum mechanics fails the criterion for time reversal (1).   
 
Proof that QM fails time reversibility.  
 
Watanabe also demonstrated that past-directed probabilities required by (1) for time 
reversibility of quantum mechanics or thermodynamics are not law-like in nature. The 
simplest proof is as follows: it shows that (1) combined with (1*) entails 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Since our universe is far from equilibrium, this is 
empirically contradicted in nature, and (1) must be false.  
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Proof. The condition (1*) actually holds of quantum mechanics. If (1) also held we 
could immediately infer (equating the RH Sides of (1) and (1*)):  
prob(Ts1(t +t)|Ts2(t)) = prob(Ts2(t-t)|Ts1(t)) 
Since s1 and s2 range over all states, including reversed states, this is equivalent to: 
prob(s1(t +t)|s2(t)) = prob(s2(t-t)|s1(t)) 
Because this holds for all t, this is equivalent to:  
prob(s1(t +t)|s2(t)) = prob(s2(t)|s1(t+t)) 
Now expanding these as conditional probabilities:  
prob(s1(t +t) & s2(t)) = prob(s2(t) & s1(t+t)) 
 prob(s2(t)) prob(s1(t+t)) 
Then assuming we are dealing with non-zero probabilities, this entails: 
 prob(s2(t)) = prob(s1(t+t)) 
Since this holds for all states, we have:  
 prob(s1(t)) = prob(s1(t+t)) 
and hence: 
 prob(s1(t)) = prob(s2(t)) 
This means that the probability of all states is equal at all times. But this is the 
condition for thermodynamic equilibrium.  
Hence (1*) and (1) together imply that all systems are expected to be in 
thermodynamic equilibrium. But it is an empirical fact that most systems are not in 
equilibrium: far from it. This is very strong empirical evidence against the 
conjunction: (1*) & (1). Since the condition (1*) is true, the condition (1) is false.  
 
Now this derivation may seem a little abstract, but we can understand it more 
intuitively if we consider what a closed non-equilibrium system means for past-
directed probabilities. Such a system evolves towards equilibrium in the future – by 
the laws of thermodynamics. This is ensured in quantum mechanics by the law-like 
probabilities of state transitions towards the future ‘randomizing’ mixtures of states.6 
But a non-equilibrium system relaxing to equilibrium towards the future will be seen 
to evolve away from equilibrium towards the past. This must contradict the possibility 
                                                 
6 While classical thermodynamics relies on an assumption of a randomized mixtures of states, and it is 
logically possible for entropy to decrease from special initial conditions, this is only because it has a 
fully deterministic micro-theory. In quantum mechanics, with an intrinsically probabilistic micro-
theory, entropy increase is ensured by law. 
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of past-directed law-like probabilities identical to the future directed laws. Such 
probabilities simply do not exist in real physics.  
As Watanabe emphasized, this equally reflects the fact that causation in the real 
world is temporally asymmetric. Causation only works in a law-like manner in one 
direction: from the present towards the future, not from the present towards the past. 
The failure of quantum mechanics to satisfy (1) corresponds to the temporal 
directedness of causation, and this allows our ability to deliberately control initial 
conditions, which allows us to set up experiments that explicitly contradict any past 
directed probability laws. By contrast, we cannot set up experiments to contradict 
future directed probability laws of quantum mechanics (as least, not as far as most 
physicist know7) – if we could, quantum mechanics would be proved wrong. It is not 
‘merely human manipulation’ that allows us to experimentally contradict past-directed 
probability laws. It is the absence of past-directed probability laws in nature that 
allows ‘human manipulation’ to be possible in the first place. 
 
The popular fallacy of reversibility.  
 
The error of calling quantum mechanics ‘reversible’ or ‘time symmetric’ because it 
has the symmetry (1*) has led to a vast confusion in the scientific-philosophical 
literature on time. The popular fallacy, repeated endlessly in popular lectures as well 
academic articles, is that “fundamental physics is reversible, and hence the time 
reversal of our whole universe and all its processes is equally consistent with the laws 
of nature as the actual universe. If we could reverse the entire present state of the 
universe (perfectly), it would all run backwards. All the normal processes we see 
running forwards (eggs breaking, rivers running downhill, etc) would undo 
themselves: eggs would mend, rivers would run uphill, etc.”   
Now this was first envisaged in classical physics, with its purely deterministic 
reversible laws. In this context it is justifiable. But in quantum mechanics with its 
intrinsically probabilistic laws it is a fallacy.  
                                                 
7 Experiments claiming quantum probabilities can be influenced by mental intentions would contradict 
this – but these are rejected by most physicists. 
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 If we took the exact time reversal of the present state of the world, and evolved it 
according to quantum mechanics (and other laws, e.g. GTR), it would not evolve 
backwards through its original process. 
The basic reason it can work in classical physics is because the theory is fully 
deterministic, and if we took the exact state reversal of the classical universe, by 
definition it is precisely tuned to run backwards. But the reversed state has to be 
essentially perfect. If we made the tiniest perturbations in the reversed state, e.g. 
giving a single atom in each star a slightly different momentum, these would rapidly 
magnify, and thermodynamic chaos would ensue. The time reversed state would 
return to thermodynamic chaos, and after a brief period of entropy reduction (or 
processes running backwards), it would go back into a process of entropy increase.  
However in quantum mechanics, such perturbations are inevitable and pervasive. 
Quantum thermodynamics is intrinsically irreversible (like quantum mechanics). 
Processes cannot be made to go backwards in quantum mechanics. The expected 
behavior is illustrated in Figures 6-8.  
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Figure 6. Universe between two times, with expanding radius and increasing entropy 
– like our own. This may be classical quantum mechanical.  
 
2. TU: Reversal of Classical Universe state at t = 1




























Figure 7. Classical universe, generated by full micro-state reversal of U at t =1. Past 
and future are projected from the reversed state at t = 1, using laws of classical 
physics. This is the exact time reversal of original universe U. 
 
3. TU: Reversal of Quantum-GTR Universe state at t = 1





























Figure 8. Quantum universe, generated by full micro-state reversal of U at t =1. Past 
and future are projected from the reversed state at t = 1, using laws of quantum 
mechanics. This is very different to the time reversal of original universe U. 
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Figures 6-8 illustrate the reversibility of classical dynamics and the irreversibility of 
quantum dynamics. We assume first a universe U with smoothly expanding radius and 
(slightly wobbly) increasing entropy, as considered typical of our own cosmological 
period. We then take the time reversal of the exact micro-state at t = 1, and use it to 
define another universe, TU. We project the past and future of TU using the laws of 
physics acting on the reversed micro-state at t = 1. However we get two radically 
different results, depending on whether we assume reversible deterministic (classical) 
laws, or probabilistic (quantum) laws.  
 Figure 7. In the classical context, the reversed universe we produce is the exact 
time reversal of U. It has contracting radius and decreasing entropy.  
 Figure 8. But in the quantum context, the reversed universe we produce is very 
different to the time reversal of U. It has contracting radius (assuming laws 
governing cosmic expansion are reversible). But the entropy only decreases in the 
future for a short period. Chaos soon reasserts, and entropy increases again, just 
as in real life physics.  
 The projection from the reversed quantum state at t = 1 to the past is highly 
problematic – quantum mechanics does not tell us how to make any such 
projection! If we make the usual ‘past hypothesis’, that the highly ordered system 
at t = 1 is the causal product of the past, then we could (possibly) project 
decreasing entropy in the past. However there is no clear answer to what should be 
retrodicted about the past. The fact is the universe with the ‘entropy hiccup’ is so 
peculiar that it appears to break all the laws of physics! So indeed, the time 
reversal of the state of our universe is hardly a physically possible state.  
 
Reversing the entire state in the quantum context (or indeed any context where some 
processes are intrinsically probabilistic) only produces a kind of ‘hiccup’ in the 
entropy climb. The reversed system ‘runs backwards’ for a short time – reducing 
entropy momentarily – but then processes reassert their normal directions again. E.g. a 
reversed river will flow uphill for a short period – but chaos ensues, the perfectly 
arranged conditions needed for reverse flow to continue quickly breaks down, and 
very soon the river will start flowing back downhill. This would apply to small 
processes as well – if we could actually produce the time reversal of a small, closed 
quantum process that exhibits thermodynamic behavior, we should find this only 
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gives a brief ‘entropy hiccup’, and entropy does not continue to fall for long.  (We 
will revisit this in more detail in Part 4.) 
 
The illustrations we have seen also illustrate different but equivalent ways of 
analyzing reversibility.  
 One is to take the time reversal of a theory, say TL, and compare it to the original 
theory, L. If they are equivalent, i.e. L = TL, then L is reversible. (Invariant under 
time reversal). If L ≠ TL, then L is irreversible. We saw this is the earlier 
derivation of (1). 
 Another is to take a solution to L (a process, call it U), obtain its time reversal, TU, 
and then see if TU obeys L. If so for every U, then L is reversible. If not, L is 
irreversible. We saw this in the second counter-example above. We need only one 
such counter example to show L is irreversible.  
 Another, illustrated above, is to take a specific instantaneous state of an L process, 
U, take the state reversal, and use L to project the past and future states. If this 
produces a new process, TU that statistically conforms to the original U, then L 
may be reversible. But if it produces a process that is radically incompatible with 
TU, then L is irreversible. This is what Figure 8 illustrates.  
 
Experimental confirmation of irreversibility of quantum 
thermodynamics. 
In the last ten years, there has been a renewed interest in the physics of irreversibility 
by research physicists. But the subject of time reversal in quantum thermodynamics 
has still been theoretical, not experimental – until the last couple of years. This is 
because it is so difficult to experimentally produce the time reversal of any real 
quantum system. However in 2015 a team from Brazil, Austria and Ireland confirmed 
the irreversibility of quantum thermodynamics by direct experiment (Batalhão et aila, 
2015). This is the first time such an experiment has been done. They have actually 
produced the time reversal of a thermodynamic process, and measured the entropy 
changes of both the forwards and reversed processes. To understand their results, they 
are trying to experimentally confirm a key equation: 
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 “<> = S(Ft||Bt-) (1) 
“The above equation quantifies irreversibility at the microscopic quantum 
level and for the most general dynamical process responsible for the 
evolution of a driven closed system. A process is thus reversible … if 
forward and backward microscopic dynamics are indistinguishable. 
(Batalhão et aila, 2015, p.1). 
 
I.e. <> = 0 implies reversibility. They confirm instead <> ≠ 0. In fact this is the 
result expected theoretically: that quantum thermodynamics is irreversible! I 
reproduce the following diagram from their paper:  
 
 
“Figure 1. A quantum system … is initially prepared in a thermal state … 
at inverse temperature. It is driven by a fast quench into the non-
equilibrium state along a forward protocol described by the Hamiltonian 
HF... In the backward process, the system starts in the equilibrium state 
corresponding to the final Hamiltonian … and is driven by the time-
reversed Hamiltonian. The entropy production (at time t is given by the 
Kullback-Leibler divergence between forward and backward states  
(Ft||Bt-) (Eq. 1).”  (Batalhão et aila, 2015, p.1.) 
 
They apparently measured entropy production for a quantum thermodynamic process, 
and for the time reversed process, forcing the time reversed final state and time 
reversed Hamiltonian on the system. They confirmed an irreversible quantum 
thermodynamic process (with: Ft||Bt-) ≠ 0). They introduce the study as follows: 
“The microscopic laws of classical and quantum mechanics are time 
symmetric, and hence reversible. However, paradoxically, macroscopic 
phenomena are not time-reversal invariant [1,2]. This fundamental 
asymmetry defines a preferred direction of time that is characterized by a 
mean entropy production. Regardless of the details and nature of the 
evolution at hand, such entropy production is bound to be positive by the 
second law of thermodynamics [3]. Since its introduction by Eddington in 
1927 [4], the thermodynamic arrow of time has not been tested 




Note their primary references to the concepts of time reversal and time symmetry are 
the orthodox accounts of [1] (Lebowitz 1993), and [2] (Zeh 1989). They are testing 
entropy production in a quantum system for the first time. They conclude: 
“Conclusions. – We have assessed the emergence of the arrow of time in a 
thermodynamically irreversible process by using the tools provided by the 
framework of non equilibrium quantum thermodynamics. We have 
implemented a fast quenched dynamics on an effective qubit in an NMR 
setting, assessing both the mean entropy produced across the process and the 
distance between the state of the system and its reverse version, at all times 
of the evolution. Let us discuss the physical origin of such time-asymmetry 
in a closed quantum system. Using an argument put forward by Loschmidt 
in the classical context, its time evolution should in principle be fully 
reversible [1]. How can then a unitary equation, like the Schrödinger 
equation, lead to Eq. (1) that contains a strictly nonnegative relative 
entropy? The answer to this puzzling question lies in the observation that the 
description of physical processes requires both equations of motion and 
initial conditions [1, 13]. The choice of an initial thermal equilibrium state 
singles out a particular value of the entropy, breaks time-reversal invariance 
and thus leads to the arrow of time. The dynamics can only be fully 
reversible for a genuine equilibrium process for which the entropy 
production vanishes at all times.” (Batalhão et aila, 2015, p.4.) 
 
Now they have done a very sophisticated experiment. And I think what they have 
demonstrated in the laboratory for the first time is essentially the phenomenon we 
have seen as the ‘hiccup’ in entropy, and reassertion of chaos, as in Figure 8. This is 
what we naturally expect when we understand the quantum mechanics is irreversible.  
But what remains unclear in their paper are their comments on the interpretation 
of how irreversibility arises. They refer to the ‘paradox’ that “quantum mechanics are 
time symmetric, and hence reversible. However, paradoxically, macroscopic 
phenomena are not time-reversal invariant.” And later: “How can then a unitary 
equation, like the Schrödinger equation, lead to Eq. (1) that contains a strictly 
nonnegative relative entropy?” They are bothered by this, and they defer “the answer 
to this puzzling question” to the orthodox account, saying it “lies in the observation 
that the description of physical processes requires both equations of motion and 
initial conditions [1, 13].” And then they make the statement that: “The choice of an 
initial thermal equilibrium state singles out a particular value of the entropy, breaks 
time-reversal invariance and thus leads to the arrow of time. The dynamics can only 
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be fully reversible for a genuine equilibrium process for which the entropy production 
vanishes at all times.”  
Now this is not very clear, and from our point of view, it is wrong. Their opening 
assumption that: “The microscopic laws of classical and quantum mechanics are time 
symmetric, and hence reversible” is false. Quantum mechanics is not “time symmetric 
or reversible”. The ‘paradox’ they refer to is a real one: if quantum mechanics was 
reversible, the irreversible processes they have experimentally demonstrated would 
not be possible! Their explanation that it is “The choice of … an initial state” that 
“breaks time-reversal invariance and thus leads to the arrow of time” is simply a 
repetition of the fuzzy orthodox view, and it is wrong. If quantum mechanics really 
has a given symmetry property (reversibility) then nothing humans choose to do could 
contradict this property!  
They are correct that “The dynamics can only be fully reversible for a genuine 
equilibrium process for which the entropy production vanishes at all times.” This is 
exactly what we found above. But since they demonstrate an irreversible process, we 
must conclude that quantum mechanics is irreversible. A general theory like quantum 
mechanics cannot be ‘reversible’ sometimes (when applied to an equilibrium system) 
and then ‘irreversible’ at other times. It is simply irreversible.  
In particular, it is the vague appeal to a distinction between ‘reversibility of laws’ 
and ‘irreversibility of systems defined by special initial conditions’ that ‘breaks 
reversibility’, repeated by all the orthodox theorists, that is at fault. This is wrong. 
This distinction only gives an illusion of resolving the ‘paradox’. They rely on 
Lebowitz (1993) and Zeh (1989) for their understanding of this, but both those 
authors give typical statements of the orthodox account, and in particular, neither is 
aware of the crucial difference between (1*) and (1) that we have discussed in detail 
here. The real resolution is that the ‘paradox’ reflects that quantum mechanics is 
irreversible. Ignorance of this simple fact is why the paradox of ‘irreversibility out of 
reversibility’ never goes away, and is revisited by generation after generation of 
philosophers of physics, with no progress in understanding.  
This is not a significant flaw in the (Batalhão et aila, 2015) study. Their 
achievement is a major step forward in experimentation. They have confirmed the 
expected experimental result: quantum thermodynamics is irreversible. Rather, it is a 
deep flaw that persists in the theory of time reversal.  
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Common objections to the proof of (1).  
Orthodox theorists in the subject of time directionality will go to extreme lengths to 
defend their theory. The conventional view is central to their scientific world view: a 
paradigm that time is intrinsically non-directional, like space. We now look at some 
of the common objections offered. These have all been given by peer reviewers as 
reasons to repeatedly reject publication of papers I have submitted on the subject. 
Most are unscientific, and obvious fallacies. There are only two real issues, at the 
bottom of the list, that we should reply to in detail. Because they are almost all 
fallacies, I have organized them in groups showing typical examples of these fallacies.  
 
A list of typical objections. 
Conceptual fallacies:  
a. Criticism of (1*) has only been demonstrated with a ‘toy theory’ – in the real theory 
of quantum mechanics, (1*) is the right criterion.  
b. Any ‘criterion for time reversibility’ must be adapted specifically to the theory in 
question. It must be interpreted for the real theory being analyzed. In quantum 
mechanics, (1*) is the appropriate criterion, and (1) is not.  
c. We need to select a criterion that works for the theory in question. (1*) works for 
quantum mechanics. (2) shows it is a theorem in quantum mechanics. (1) does not 
work: it is false for quantum mechanics.  
d. There is no universal interpretation of what ‘time reversal’ means or what its 
‘criterion’ is., only interpretations relative to specific theories. E.g. it is well 
known that the special nature of quantum mechanics means ‘time reversal’ must 
be represented by the complex state operator: T*, not by T as in most other 
theories. If there was a universal definition, we would have to adopt T: but it is 
well known that T is impossible in quantum mechanics.  
Interpretational fallacies:  
e. A clear operationalist interpretation of the concept of ‘reversibility’ must first be 
given to base the argument on – until this is given the argument is unfounded.  
f. The concept of ‘past-directed probabilities’ has no meaning or application in 
quantum mechanics – hence (1) is inapplicable in the quantum context.  
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g. quantum mechanics may be given a deterministic interpretation – on this 
interpretation the probabilities will disappear at the fundamental level, and the 
dynamics will be fully reversible, just as in classical dynamics.  
h. The argument is just semantics: playing with definitions. In physics, only 
experimental evidence for claims like time symmetry is meaningful. The author 
needs to specify experiments that demonstrate ‘irreversibility’.  
i. The problem is just semantic: it is about the conventional choice of terms to refer to 
the real symmetries of quantum mechanics. Physicists have chosen to call it 
reversibility or time symmetry, and there is no reason to change this convention.  
Scientistic fallacies: 
j. This question has been dealt with by many other eminent authors who all agree that 
quantum mechanics is reversible. The arguments given are bound to be wrong, 
although I am not going to waste my time analyzing the errors.  
j* (They cannot be published in a reputable journal: some readers may take them 
seriously even though they are wrong; questioning well established scientific facts 
like the reversibility of quantum mechanics undermines the authority of science.) 
Irrelevance fallacies:  
k. Quantum mechanics only fails the condition (1) because of the asymmetry between 
initial and final conditions – which is caused by the merely de facto 
thermodynamic asymmetry of the larger universe – not by irreversibility of the 
laws of quantum mechanics.  
l. The failure of condition (1) is caused by ‘measurement’ or ‘wave function collapse’ 
- which depends on interference with the system by an outside ‘classical’ 
measuring system. If you reversed the measurement process completely, this 
measurement process must also be reversible.  
Relevant objections: 
m. quantum mechanics does not give conditional probabilities at all: it gives transition 
probabilities between states, conditional on measurements being made. (1) is 
inapplicable.  
n. The empirical evidence for the failure of depends on irreversible systems, but these 
are already pre-selected with low entropy, and this is why the condition (1) fails. 
For an unbiased test we must define samples that are both pre-selected and post-
selected in a time symmetric way. Such samples or ensembles are governed by the 
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theory of time symmetric quantum mechanics, defined by (Aharonov, et alia, 
1964; Cocke, 1967). This is called the ABL theory. It is fully time symmetric. This 
refuted the arguments raised by Watanabe, which were essentially the same as 
raised here.  
Reply to objections.  
Given such a host of objections, it may seem there are a lot of problems with the 
proofs given above! But almost all these are fallacies, and some are no more than 
facetious. However anyone who has challenged an established scientific-philosophical 
paradigm will understand that you need to face up to repeated attacks, and reply to 
many mistaken and facetious objections, if you wish to be heard. So here are replies. 
Many hardly deserve serious reply from a scientific point of view; but gate keepers in 
the subject readily accept them as reasons to reject publication of unwelcome views.8 
 
a. It is not a ‘toy theory’, it is a mathematical model. We use models to give proofs. It 
has been proved that (1*) cannot be universally adequate as the criterion for 
reversibility. But (1*) has been assumed as the universal criterion for reversibility, 
without any proof. What is wrong with the proofs?  
b. (1*) is proved to be generally inadequate for any theory defined by a class of 
conditional probability laws. (1) is proved to be definitely wrong. Probability 
theory is common across multiple theories: its mathematical laws do not change 
from theory to theory. The onus is on the defense to show in detail how (1*) can 
be considered adequate. What is wrong with the proofs? 
c. This is a basic misunderstanding of concepts. If we can only select a criterion that is 
satisfied by the theory in question, then reversibility becomes analytic. But the 
problem is not to select a criterion that ‘works’ for the theory. The problem is to 
define the correct criterion to represent the symmetry, and then check if the theory 
has that property. What is wrong with the proofs? 
                                                 
8 Interestingly though, once Holster (2003) was accepted in a serious physics journal, no objection to it 
has been published as far as I am aware. The orthodox analysts have made no reference to it, despite 
continuing to try to find ways around it – in new programs dedicated to finding ‘alternative definitions 
of time symmetry or reversibility’ that will allow them to maintain their views – without 
acknowledging why they need to find ‘new definitions of reversibility’ in the first place. The 
impossibility of doing this will be shown in Part 3, when we return to fundamental concepts.   
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d. There is a universal definition of what ‘reversibility’ or ‘time symmetry’ means: 
invariance under the transformation: T: t  -t. If there is no such definition then 
we do not know what we are talking about. The use of T* rather than T is in fact 
another error, analyzed in Part 2 – the error of adapting the definition of a concept 
to get the result we want. The definition of time symmetry is discussed in Part 3. 
What is wrong with the proofs? 
e. The proofs given are independent of any ‘operationalist definitions’. They need to 
be addressed in their own terms. What is their specific error? The demand for an 
‘operationalist definition’ makes the arrogant assumption that everyone must 
agree with a positivist theory of meaning - there is no need to give any such theory 
of semantics. What is wrong with the proofs? 
f. The concept of ‘past-directed conditional probabilities’ has a clear meaning. It 
implies the statistics will match the conditional probabilities. The fact that such 
probabilities are not entailed by quantum mechanics, and do not match the real 
world, means that quantum mechanics fails (1). What is wrong with the proofs? 
g. A deterministic interpretation is not quantum mechanics as we know it. It must 
postulate a more fine-grained set of micro-properties than represented by the 
standard quantum mechanics. (Most quantum physicists doubt it is possible to find 
a deterministic interpretation anyway; but this is not the point.) The standard 
theory of quantum mechanics is defined as a probabilistic theory, with irreducible 
probabilities. This is what the error is about: whether the standard theory of 
quantum mechanics is reversible. It is not whether some other hypothetical theory 
is reversible. What is wrong with the proofs? 
h. The objection is just playing with semantics. Time symmetry is an analytic  
property of theories. The orthodox analysis does not specify experiments to 
demonstrate quantum mechanics is reversible. It specifies theorems. Physicists do 
experiments to demonstrate quantum mechanics is true, not to demonstrate its 
mathematical structure. If the argument is ‘playing with definitions’, what 
definitions are mistaken? For a long time there were no experiments 
demonstrating quantum irreversibility, but now experiments have been done, this 
changes nothing about the property of the theory. What is wrong with the proofs? 
i. The objection is just playing with semantics. The question is about the fact of 
whether quantum mechanics is reversible or not. The orthodox analysis has got the 
 25 
facts wrong. It is unacceptable to change the meanings of words like ‘time 
symmetry’ to conceal mistakes in analysis. What is wrong with the proofs? 
j. The ‘eminent authors’ do not consider the problem raised here: they assume (1*) is 
true without proof. Appeal to authority does not settle scientific questions. What is 
wrong with the proofs? 
k. The objection is proposing an explanation for irreversibility of processes, but that is 
a different question. Does the objection accept (1) is the criterion for time 
symmetry? If not, no objection to (1) has been given. If so, the question is: does 
quantum mechanics satisfy the criterion (1) for time symmetry? If not, then it is 
not time symmetric. Speculation about the reasons it fails time symmetry is not 
relevant to the fact that it fails time symmetry. We may add that the assumption 
that the thermodynamic directionality of the larger universe is ‘merely de facto’ is 
made only because it has been assumed quantum mechanics is reversible. What is 
wrong with the proofs? 
l. Again, the question is: does quantum mechanics satisfy the criterion for time 
symmetry? If not, then it is not time symmetric. If this is a criticism of the 
criterion we have adopted, then what is wrong with it? Views about ‘quantum 
measurement’ are many and various: the definition of quantum probabilities is 
fixed by the Born postulate. What is wrong with the proofs? 
m. This is the first serious objection: it actually gives a relevant argument, not against 
(1), but against the application of (1) to quantum mechanics. However it is weak. 
First, what is the proof that quantum mechanics fails to give conditional 
probabilities? Do not ‘transition probabilities’ entail conditional probabilities? In 
any case, it is immediately open to a similar objection: time symmetry then 
require  past-directed ‘transition probabilities’, not future-directed transition 
probabilities as claimed by (1*). So (1*) is still wrong. And quantum mechanics in 
fact gives no past-directed transition probabilities in symmetry with the future 
directed transition probabilities, for exactly the same reason it fails (1). The fact 
remains that (1*) is false and (1) is correct.  
n. This is the critical objection, and a source of real controversy. Note first that this 
does not object to (1) or attempt to defend (1*). Rather, the ‘ABL theory’ is 
symmetric in the sense of (1). The problem is that this is not the real theory of 
quantum mechanics. It only applies to ensembles that represent equilibrium 
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statistics, or time symmetric statistics, by definition. Does it apply to the real 
world? No. the real world is not time symmetric. So the immediate reply to this 
objection is that it does not represent an objection to the arguments that real 
quantum statistics contradicts time symmetry. The time symmetry of ABL theory is 
irrelevant.  
However the most interesting issue is the argument that ‘real world’ quantum 
experiments are temporally biased because they depends on pre-selection, but not 
post-selection in an asymmetric fashion. This is ultimately an issue about what 
constitutes a fair or unbiased sample to test a probabilistic theory. This is why 
Counter-Example 2 above was given in detail. Does the statistical sampling 
principle represented in this model represent fair sampling to test a set of 
probability laws? If so, then I think the case that quantum mechanics is 
asymmetric is sound. The present objection must hold that it is not a fair sampling 
procedure. If such a fundamental principle is in doubt, this goes to the heart of the 
scientific method itself. Given that there is disagreement about this at all shows 
that this needs further discussion.  
 
It should be finally mentioned that many writers have claimed that quantum 
mechanics is time symmetric or reversible, but then noted an exception: that the 
quantum measurement process is irreversible. The reason usually given however is 
not by identifying the irreversibility of the probability theory, but by observing that 
‘quantum measurement’ is a concept of an ‘irreversible’ process in its own right; a 
reduction of the wave function by ‘external observation’; and so on. However this is 
then subsequently ignored, as something to do with the peculiar role of ‘observation’ 
in quantum mechanics, and not reflecting ‘irreversible dynamics’. Thus it has always 
been left in a peculiarly uncertain subjective status (like all questions about 
‘measurement’ or ‘wave function collapse’ in the orthodox Copenhagen 
interpretation.) However we have identified it explicitly as giving rise to irreversible 
probabilistic dynamics. It does not matter what the theory of ‘measurement’ or ‘wave 




There is no real doubt that (1) is correct and (1*) is wrong as the criterion for time 
symmetry of probabilistic theories, defined by classes of conditional probability laws. 
Neither is there much doubt that ordinary quantum mechanics as we know it fails (1) 
and is time asymmetric. Nor is there much doubt that this gives rise to irreversible 
processes. This severely undermines the orthodox view that time is ‘intrinsically 
symmetric’ in physics. However this is just the start of the problems. We will examine 
further issues in subsequent parts. It should be stressed that it is not just the 
irreversibility of ordinary quantum mechanics that is key to our view of time in 
nature; it is the status and interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the wider context 
of physics, including cosmology. Is quantum mechanics ultimately fundamental? Is 
physics fundamentally probabilistic, or is there a deterministic level underlying it? 
These are the real questions that must be answered before we can draw inferences 
from the theory of quantum mechanics to the nature of the real world.  
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